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Are Latin American military dictatorships able to successfully democratize? 
Lauren Welling 
ABSTRACT 
Latin American countries have faced difficulties in regards to establishing a successful 
democracy, as nations have succumbed to military power in the form of dictatorships. This paper 
will evaluate the patterns of military dictatorships in Latin America, specifically the rise and fall 
of the military junta in Chile. Furthermore, the factors that enabled democratization will be 
examined to demonstrate that achieving democracy is possible for Latin American nations. 
 
Democracy is the most popular form of 
government across the globe due to its 
resounding approval from world powers 
such as the United States. However, 
achieving a successful democracy in Latin 
America has proven to be difficult as most 
Latin American nations have succumbed to 
military power in the form of dictatorships. 
What is the likelihood that Latin American 
military dictatorships democratize? I argue 
that for military dictatorships to democratize 
the military officials that have achieved 
power must be publicly opposed by the 
citizens, and the military also must consent 
to leave their positions of power. In this 
paper, I demonstrate that democratization is 
possible in countries where authoritarian 
regimes exist with evidence that supports the 
notion that militaries only do what is in their 
best interest when threatened by the 
mobilization of citizens opposed to their 
authority. The next section reviews the 
literature on how others have tried to answer 
this question and offers a path forward to 
study the concept differently. I then conduct 
a case study, or quantitative analysis before 
concluding with suggestions for future 
research. 
Literature Review 
According to Barbara Geddes, when the 
leader of an autocratic regime loses power, 
one of three things can happen, the first 
being the incumbent leadership group is 
replaced by democratically elected leaders. 
Another possibility is that someone from the 
incumbent leadership group replaces him, 
and the regime persists. Or, the incumbent 
leadership group loses control to a different 
group that replaces it. The latter became 
rampant in Latin America throughout the 
1970s and 1980s in the form of military 
dictatorships. Democratic leaders were 
being overthrown in coups d’états and were 
replaced by military juntas. A military 
dictatorship is a regime where power was 
obtained through a coup which is typically 
enacted with the use of violence against the 
preexisting state. The defining feature of the 
military dictatorship is that the highest 
governmental officials have served (or 
continue to serve) in the armed forces and 
the governors are primarily dependent on the 
support of the officer corps for the retention 
of power (Wintrobe). Moreover, the classic 
means for a dictator to accumulate and 
maintain political power over the citizens is 
through political repression (Wintrobe). This 
paper will specifically focus on the military 
dictatorships in Latin America that have 
worked toward democratization, particularly 
in the case of Chile. 
If a government becomes unstable, it is not 
uncommon for citizens to ask their militaries 
to intervene and take over the executive 
political power in their country. Generally, 
when this occurs the military will/place 
themselves in power without democratic 
processes. This method was prominent in 
the Cold War era, especially in Latin 
America. The typical attributes of a nation 
that was vulnerable to a military coup are a 
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weak state authority, imminent foreign 
threats, ethnic or sectarian competition for 
the control of the executive, natural resource 
wealth. Recent wars of independence or 
civil wars may also elevate the military to a 
prominent political role and thus enhance 
capacity for government to intervene 
(Svolik). Usually, governments that are 
overthrown by militaries are preceded by 
eras of turbulence. The issue in Latin 
American nations was that they generally 
had weak state authorities. The state 
authority in Latin America was unable to 
support the social demands of their citizens 
which ultimately led to dissatisfaction in the 
power of the government. 
Additionally, in Latin America the challenge 
to maintain democracy derives from the fact 
that the military power was able to easily 
dominate the civilian government 
(Rosenberg). In other words, the militaries 
in Latin America often had more power than 
the governments themselves. This concept is 
frequently labeled as the civil military 
problematique. In this circumstance, the 
relationship between the civilian 
government and the military becomes 
complicated because without funding for the 
military, the security of the nation could be 
jeopardized. However, if the weak civilian 
government continues to fund the military it 
can become a threat to the security of 
democracy. The difficulty for countries in 
Latin America was giving the military 
legitimate power, but also ensuring that it 
did not become an internal threat to the 
sovereignty of the nation. Governments that 
have no power over their military forces are 
easier to overthrow. Likewise, in societies 
with very high levels of inequality, the 
society is more likely to be nondemocratic 
(either oligarchic or a military dictatorship). 
In these cases, spending more money on the 
military would be problematic considering 
the government is already in a weakened 
environment. Spending more money on the 
military would only serve to weaken the 
government as the central power to a larger 
extent causing it to be insecure. (Acemoglu, 
Ticchi and Vindigni). Furthermore, 
economic inequality or ethnic and religious 
divisions determine the form and magnitude 
of the policy wide political conflict (Svolik). 
This was a driving force in Chile as many 
people were divided in support or opposition 
to the political ideology of Allende. 
When militaries acquire a stronghold on 
political power there are a variety of reasons 
that they maintain power for extended 
periods of time. Primarily, the violent 
overthrow of a totalitarian government in the 
form of a military dictatorship is a vicious 
cycle (Tesar and Wilson).  The most 
common method of attempting to overthrow 
governments in power is in the form of 
revolution. However, the likelihood of long-
term success is rather small if the 
“revolutionary” route is attempted (Tesar 
and Wilson). Additionally, even if the 
revolution is successful, the fall of a dictator 
is hardly ever accompanied by the fall of the 
dictatorship (Tesar and Wilson). Therefore, 
the system in place that the people are in 
opposition to does not change in their favor, 
despite their efforts.  
Repression is the technique used by dictators 
to maintain their authority in politics. 
Popular restrictions placed on citizens under 
military dictatorships are as follows: 
restrictions on freedom of press, the rights of 
opposition parties to campaign against the 
government, and outright prohibition of 
groups, associations, or political parties 
opposed to the government (Wintrobe). The 
common denominator between these 
restrictions is that they prohibit the people 
from criticizing the government. In the case 
of Chile, the military junta exercised their 
power by condemning people in society that 
openly spoke out against the country’s 
leadership. The junta in Chile is known for 
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violating human rights during this era by 
torturing and imprisoning people that did not 
support the new government. 
Although repression was an effective 
method in oppressing citizens it was not 
effective enough to deter citizens from 
overthrowing the military governments. 
Typically, leaders of military dictatorships 
are less likely to survive in office than 
leaders of nonmilitary ones (Svolik). This 
could be due to the concept that military 
dictatorships have a disadvantage at 
accumulating political loyalty (Wintrobe). 
This is an easy concept to understand as the 
military-style regimes are not democratically 
elected by the people and the regimes are 
known for repressing the rights of citizens. 
Countercoups are quite common in military 
governments as citizens attempt to win back 
power from the nondemocratic regime 
(Wintrobe). Countercoups were twice as 
likely in a military as in a civilian regime, 
and the vast majority of countercoups 
involve the overthrow of one military 
government and its replacement by another 
(Wintrobe). As demonstrated previously, 
violent overthrows can start vicious cycles 
which only result in another military 
government taking power.  
The voluntary transfer of power to civilian 
regimes has been known to occur, despite 
the violence these regimes face (Wintrobe). 
Of the 51 military dictators in the world that 
transitioned peacefully to a civilian 
government, none of them were killed (Ju). 
In comparison, 28 out of 203 military 
dictators were killed when transitioning 
power from one dictator to another (Ju). The 
threat of violence against the military regime 
ironically leads them to submit to civilian-
led governments. 
Nations in Latin America have been able to 
achieve democracy after military authority. 
It is argued that after a military regime has 
fallen from power the first issue to be solved 
is the solution of what to do with previous 
leaders (Rosenberg). In Chile, Pinochet 
continued serving in the Chilean military 
after his dictatorship came to an end. This 
demonstrates the idea that even under 
democracy, military leaders remain secure in 
the knowledge that their crimes will be 
judged in friendly military courts or not at 
all after their junta ends because the newly 
democratic states are too weak to guarantee 
that the juntas will not return to power 
(Rosenberg). With the looming power of a 
possible reemergence of military authority, 
newly appointed democratic leaders have 
been known to be lenient in regards to 
previous oppressive leaders. Despite being 
democratic, nations in Latin America know 
they only remain democratic as long as the 
military is in support of the democratic 
decisions. Rosenberg argues that trials for 
previous leaders are crucial for democracy’s 
long-term health, but they are seldom 
attempted. She uses the example of the three 
military uprisings in Argentina that occurred 
when Alfonsin, the new democratic leader, 
attempted to hold trials for his military 
predecessors. The uprisings were enough for 
Alfonsin to end the trials. The legacy of 
military dictatorships can hamper newly 
elected democratic officials if the preceding 
regime leaders continue to hold some form 
of power in society. 
Case Study: Chile 
In Chile, the military dictatorship came to 
power due to the era of turbulence that 
proceded to military takeover. The 
opposition to the civil government began 
after the election of Salvador Allende; his 
government was predominantly Marxist and 
they were dedicated to changing the 
economic, political, and social structures in 
Chile (Valenzuela). Unfortunately, the 
Chilean political environment was extremely 
polarized and there was a large percentage 
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of citizens that wanted Allende out of office 
(Valenzuela). Ultimately, the opposition to 
Allende’s left wing government resulted in a 
coup d’état by the military. However, this 
was not without the help of the United States 
government which fully endorsed the 
overthrow of Allende after the Cold War 
era. The external support from a world 
power contributed to the military takeover in 
the name of containing Communism. 
Despite the United States backing of the 
Chilean military junta, the turbulent political 
era leading up to the assassination of 
Allende was the leading cause in the 
government overthrow. Citizens throughout 
Chile wanted to see Allende out of office 
and they frequently tried to impeach him 
before resulting to force (Valenzuela). Since 
the citizens were unable to overthrow 
Allende through political processes, they 
turned to their armed forces to intervene in 
political affairs. On September 11th, 1973, 
General Augusto Pinochet took over 
political office from Allende in a bloody 
coup d’etat that was supported by the 
Chilean citizens, although, assume his 
power democratically as he was not elected 
through free and fair elections. September 
11th, 1973 marked the beginning of the 
military junta in Chile. 
After the democratic government was 
overthrown many people were supportive of 
the Pinochet regime. Initially when Pinochet 
displaced Allende, people believed that he 
would only remain in power until the 
economy was stabilized (Devine). People 
anticipated that Pinochet would eventually 
step down from power and organize 
elections for a new president, but instead he 
maintained his authoritarian regime for 
approximately seventeen years. Chilean 
citizens did not mind when the military 
remained in power and rounded up people 
for interrogations because they feared 
extreme leftists (Devine). They believed 
Pinochet was reestablishing order and 
eliminating any political threats that 
continued to exist after Allende’s demise. 
This political climate allowed the Chilean 
military to violate human rights through the 
use of mass arrests, torture, forced 
“disappearances,” and killings (Devine). 
Throughout Pinochet’s reign, the Chilean 
people became disenchanted with his 
authoritarian tactics and wanted to 
overthrow him. In fact, there was a 
consensus among the citizens that the 
president himself had become the chief 
obstacle to political normalization, but no 
one believed overthrowing him was worth 
the risk (Falcoff). Eventually, the majority 
of the population in Chile was supportive of 
overthrowing the military junta that had 
taken over their government 
undemocratically. 
The mobilization of people against the 
Pinochet regime is eventually what led to 
the democratization of Chile after the coup. 
As people began to reject the coup the 
typical layers of an explosive society began 
to emerge. Similarly, citizens started to 
speak out about the abuses of the 
government; as the issues began to become 
public information the citizens of Chile 
gained the support of external forces. 
O’Donnell and Schmitter stated in 
Transitions from Military Rule that in 
“Chile, important groups within the Catholic 
Church rapidly and firmly commit 
themselves to those values;” the values they 
are discussing are human rights. This is 
especially significant because an external 
group as important as the Catholic Church 
endorsing human rights in a predominantly 
Catholic country such as Chile undermines 
the power of the military government. The 
public lack of support from citizens in Chile 
caused the military dictatorship to decide to 
democratize the government. People were 
the driving force in the military stepping 
down from power, but it should be noted 
that the military acted in their best interest as 
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they were threatened by external groups 
such as the Catholic Church and United 
States which no longer supported them. The 
military leaders in positions of power began 
to fear the possibility of a coup against 
them, and therefore opted for a peaceful 
transition of power. The military stepped 
down to ensure their own safety and they 
believed if they chose to appease the people 
with democratic elections then they might be 
able to maintain some form of power. This 
action led to their downfall as the military 
leaders were not reelected. This conveys the 
concept that in circumstances where military 
regimes face threats from citizens they will 
leave their position of power. 
The Chilean junta supports many of the 
theories discussed in the literature review. 
Furthermore, it is likely that, in the event 
that another military dictatorship occurs in 
Latin America, it will probably follow the 
same process that Chile demonstrated. 
Ultimately, it would seem by Chile’s 
example that Latin American nations are 
able to democratize successfully given that 
the military in power steps down. 
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